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AGENT DECISION-MAKING IN OPEN MIXED NETWORKS
YA'AKOV GAL, BARBARA GROSZ, SARIT KRAUS, AVI PFEFFER,
AND STUART SHIEBER
Abstract. Computer systems increasingly carry out tasks in mixed networks,
that is in group settings in which they interact both with other computer sys-
tems and with people. Participants in these heterogeneous human-computer
groups vary in their capabilities, goals, and strategies; they may cooperate,
collaborate, or compete. The presence of people in mixed networks raises
challenges for the design and the evaluation of decision-making strategies for
computer agents. This paper describes several new decision-making models
that represent, learn and adapt to various social attributes that inuence peo-
ple's decision-making and presents a novel approach to evaluating such models.
It identies a range of social attributes in an open-network setting that inu-
ence people's decision-making and thus aect the performance of computer-
agent strategies, and establishes the importance of learning and adaptation
to the success of such strategies. The settings vary in the capabilities, goals,
and strategies that people bring into their interactions. The studies deploy
a congurable system called Colored Trails (CT) that generates a family of
games. CT is an abstract, conceptually simple but highly versatile game in
which players negotiate and exchange resources to enable them to achieve their
individual or group goals. It provides a realistic analogue to multi-agent task
domains, while not requiring extensive domain modeling. It is less abstract
than payo matrices, and people exhibit less strategic and more helpful behav-
ior in CT than in the identical payo matrix decision-making context. By not
requiring extensive domain modeling, CT enables agent researchers to focus
their attention on strategy design, and it provides an environment in which
the inuence of social factors can be better isolated and studied.
1. Introduction
Computer systems are increasingly being deployed in group settings in which
they interact with people to carry out tasks [Babaian et al., 2002, Schurr et al., 2006,
Pollack, 2006, Rajarshi et al., 2001, Katz and Kraus, 2006]. To operate eectively
in such settings, computer agents need capabilities for making decisions and ne-
gotiating with other participants|both people and computer-based agents|about
the procurement and allocation of resources necessary to complete their tasks. For
example, in a civil disaster like an earthquake, rescue personnel and equipment are
dispersed geographically and may be under the jurisdiction of various dispatchers.
Dispatchers might depend on computer agents to allocate these limited resources
to aected locations quickly and to alert them about changing environmental con-
ditions, such as wind speed and trac. In turn, computer agents might depend on
people to provide up-to-the-minute information about the availability of personnel
and equipment. In another realm, in some electronic auction settings, both peo-
ple and computer agents (representing groups or individuals) might participate not
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only to acquire items of value, but also to exchange information about the reliability
of others.
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First response and e-commerce are two dierent kinds of examples of open mixed
networks. By \open" we mean that the autonomous agents in the network may
be designed by or represent dierent individuals or organizations. By \mixed"
we mean that the participants of the network may be computer agents or people.
Computer agents operating in open, mixed networks may support people in their
work (e.g., collaborative human-computer interfaces [Shieber, 1996, Babaian et al.,
2002]), serve as proxies for people or institutions (e.g., electronic commerce [Kamar
et al., 2008, Rajarshi et al., 2001]), or interact with other agents to carry out
tasks for which they are responsible (e.g., robots in rescue operations [Schurr et al.,
2006, Murphy, 2004]). These examples exhibit several key characteristics of mixed
network settings: (1) the participants are both human and computer-based; (2) they
depend on each other to make decisions; (3) they may need to exchange resources
and information; (4) they have dierent, complementary roles.
Open mixed network settings present a range of challenges for agent designers.
First, the participants in these networks|whether people or computer agents|are
loosely coupled and not under the control of any single entity. Agent designers are
unlikely to know a priori the strategies that people or agents designed by others will
adopt, and they cannot force others' agents to adopt a particular strategy. Second,
people's decision-making behavior in group settings does not follow the strategies
of classical economic or game theoretic models, but is aected by such social and
psychological factors as cognitive biases, social preferences, and framing eects [Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006, Camerer, 2003, Bazerman, 2001]. It is dicult to measure
the eects of such factors directly, and preferences are hard to elicit explicitly from
people [Castro-Schez et al., 2004, Luo et al., 2006]. Third, agents may dier in
their goals and plans, so agent designers need to develop strategies that are exibly
able to accommodate dierent levels of cooperation or competitiveness. For these
reasons, it is at best challenging, and at worst, impossible, to construct eective
agent strategies purely analytically.
An alternative approach is to learn and evaluate agent strategies empirically.
However, past empirical investigations of computer agent strategies such as the
Trading Agent Competition [Arunachalam and Sadeh, 2005] and RoboCup soc-
cer [Asada et al., 1998] have typically required a fully specied domain model. The
need for extensive modeling of domain specic knowledge in such settings makes it
dicult to distinguish among possible causes of agents' failures and successes, such
as the way agents model the specics of the domain or the way they make decisions
more generally.
On the other hand, completely abstract settings such as the payo matrices or
decision trees traditionally used in studies in the behavioral sciences collapse the
structure of a domain into a list of choices that does not capture the essential
relationships among tasks, goals and resources.
2 Such relationships often play an
important role in decision making.
1One example of an existing application like this are sniper agents that bid on e-bay as proxies
for their human users.
2For a comprehensive account of behavioral economics experiments in decision-making,
see Camerer [2003].AGENT DECISION-MAKING IN OPEN MIXED NETWORKS 3
The investigations in this paper were done in an environment that represents
an intermediate approach. They use the CT (Colored Trails) system [Grosz et al.,
2004] which provides an analogue to the ways in which goals, tasks and resources
interact in real-world settings, but abstracts away the complexities of real-world
domains. CT supports comparisons of the performance of dierent computational
strategies for interacting in groups comprising people and computer agents as well
as solely computer agents.
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This paper presents several new decision-making models that represent, learn and
adapt to various social attributes of negotiation in open, mixed-network settings.
We consider in particular, social factors that inuence possible negotiation deals
(e.g., joint benet and inequality of outcome), traits of individual negotiators (e.g.,
altruism, trustworthiness, helpfulness) and group structure (e.g., solidarity, hierar-
chy). Our results show that (1) people exhibit more helpful behavior and increase
their social welfare in CT settings than in payo-matrix types of settings; and (2)
computer agents that model and learn the social factors that inuence human ne-
gotiation strategies can outperform traditional game-theoretic equilibria strategies
when interacting with people and other computer agents in mixed networks.
The contributions of the paper are four-fold: it presents new multi-agent decision-
making models, ones that are able to learn and adapt to the social attributes that
aect behavior in open mixed networks; it presents a novel approach to evaluating
such models; it shows empirically that agents using these models outperform tradi-
tional game-theoretic equilibria strategies. Lastly, it describes CT more completely
than before as a new environment for investigating the design and performance for
negotiation strategies in open-mixed networks. It integrates earlier reports of ini-
tial CT studies [Gal et al., 2007, 2004, Talman et al., 2005] and describes a broader
range of experimental investigations which demonstrate the exibility of the CT
infrastructure to support dierent agent-design studies.
The purpose of the work reported in this paper was not to design \plug-and-play"
strategies for specic applications such as rst response or electronic commerce.
Rather, the studies we describe show empirically that agents will be better able to
negotiate with people if they take into account social factors. In this respect, our
results relate to recent work in the social sciences that point to societal and cultural
factors that people \bring into the game", as inuencing the way they behave in
negotiation settings [Ostrom et al., 1994, Cardenas et al., 2004]. Our studies dier
from these in providing and evaluating computational models for decision-making
in these settings. In particular, they identify the inuence of factors that have
not been addressed in past human-computer decision-making studies and show the
inuence of these factors on agent-strategy performance.
The next section of this paper describes CT and the ways in which it corresponds
to real-world task settings; it compares the CT environment with alternative test-
bed environments used in multi-agent system and discusses related work. Section
3 presents a study that establishes that people make dierent negotiation choices
when interacting in a CT game than when doing so in the payo-matrix settings
used in the behavioral sciences. Section 4 describes a model for learning the dierent
types of social factors that aect people's behavior in a simple negotiation setting
of complete information. Sections 5 and 6 compare the performance of dierent
3CT is open-source software, which has been made available for download at http://www.eecs.
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computational strategies for adapting to other agents' decision-making in a repeated
negotiation setting. Section 7 discusses the implications of this work for the design
of agent-strategies in open, mixed networks and presents several open research
questions.
2. The Colored Trails Game
Colored Trails (CT) is a game played by two or more participants on a board of
colored squares. The CT system is highly congurable, allowing for the specica-
tion of games that reect a wide variety of task environments and decision-making
situations. The basic CT board includes players' icons and goal squares, but cong-
urations may also include traps or other features needed to model a task situation.
Players are typically allocated a set of chips of colors chosen from the same palette
as the board squares. To move a piece into an adjacent square a player must turn
in a chip of the same color as the square. The board state may be dynamic, for
instance with goals moving or traps appearing and disappearing. A player's perfor-
mance in CT is determined by a scoring function which is a parameter of the game
conguration. The score can be dened to depend on such factors as a player's
distance from its goal-square when the game ends, the number of moves made, the
number of chips the player possesses at the end of the game, or the number of
goals achieved. In addition, to represent incentives for cooperation or social good,
an individual player's score can be made to depend on the performance of other
players.
In the canonical use of CT, paths through the board represent doing a task,
with each square in the path corresponding to a subtask. Chips represent resources
needed for doing the tasks. Typically, at least one player does not have the chips
needed to reach its goal. The heart of the game is players' abilities to negotiate
over these resources. Chips may be exchanged by the players, and the conditions
of exchange may be varied to model dierent decision-making situations.
Humans play CT using a graphical user interface, while computer agents use
a set of application program interfaces (API). Snapshots of the CT GUI for one
of the canonical games used in this paper is shown in Figure 1. The Main Game
panel (Figure 1a) includes the board game, the goal square, represented by an icon
displaying the letter G, and two icons, \me" and \sun", representing the location
of the two players on the board at the start of the game.
4 The bottom part of the
Main Game panel, titled \Chips", shows the chip distributions for the players. In
the game shown here, neither player has sucient chips to get to the goal square.
The Decision Aid panel (Figure 1c) provides decision support tools to be used by
players during the game. It displays a list of possible paths to the goal for players
and the chips required to fulll each path. Players can view this information for the
chips that they currently possess, or for any hypothetical chip set for each of the
players. For example, the \me" player is lacking a purple chip to get to the goal in
the path that is highlighted in the Main Game panel (this is the shortest possible
path for the \me" player to get to the goal). Similarly, the \sun" player is lacking
a cyan chip to get to the goal (using its shortest path to move two squares up).
The Proposal Panel (Figure 1b) can be used by players to negotiate exchanges. In
the example shown here, the \me" player has oered to give one cyan chip to the
4A \me" icon on the main board panel is used to enable a human player to easily distinguish
between the player's own icon and those of other players.AGENT DECISION-MAKING IN OPEN MIXED NETWORKS 5
(a) Main
Game
Panel
(shown at
the onset of
the game)
(b) Proposal
Panel (used
by players to
make oers)
(c) Decision
Aid Panel
(used by
players to
reason about
possible
paths to the
goal)
(d) Message History Panel (shows past oers and responses)
Figure 1. Snapshots of CT GUI6 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
\sun" player in return for one purple chip. This oer is displayed in the Message
History Panel (Figure 1d), and also includes the response of the \sun" player, which
accepted the oer.
5
2.1. Analogy with Task Settings. CT provides a realistic analog to task set-
tings, highlighting the interactions among goals, tasks required to achieve these
goals, and resources needed for completing tasks. Chips correspond to agent capa-
bilities and skills required to fulll tasks. Dierent squares on the board represent
dierent types of tasks. A player's possession of a chip of a certain color corre-
sponds to having the skill available for use at a time. Not all players possess chips
in all colors, much as dierent agents vary in their capabilities. Traversing a path
through the board corresponds to performing a complex task whose constituents
are the individual tasks represented by the colors of each square.
CT is parametrized in ways that allow for increasing complexity along various
dimensions that inuence the performance of dierent strategies and algorithms for
decision making. It allows for specication of dierent reward structures, enabling
examination of such trade-os as the one between the performance of the group as a
whole and the outcome of an individual. It also allows to examine the cost-benets
of collaboration-supporting actions.
Game parameters such as the number of players, the size of the board, and the
number of chips may be set to vary the task complexity. The amount of information
available to agents can be controlled by varying the information revealed on the
board and about players' chips. Uncertainty can be introduced by changing features
on the board and chips during play.
Two kinds of inter-dependencies among players can be varied in CT: task and
score dependence. A task dependence arises whenever players lack the chips they
need to reach their goals and must depend on other players to supply those chips. A
score dependence arises when players' scores depend on each other's performance.
The degree to which a player's score depends on the performance of other play-
ers may be used to distinguish collaborative teamwork from situations in which
group members act independently. For example, a fully cooperative setting can be
modeled in CT by setting the score for each player as the sum of all players' scores.
To illustrate the task analogy, we present an example of the way CT corresponds
to the rescue domain described in Section 1. Players in CT correspond to re-
engine dispatchers. There are dierent ways to assign players to teams, such as by
representing a dispatcher's aliation with other dispatchers in their geographical
vicinity by designating a shared goal square. A goal square might represent a
mission to accomplish, such as rescuing people from areas aicted with re and
smoke or assisting other rescue teams in dierent locations. Paths on the board
represent the completion of tasks, such as clearing safe passage in a building or
bringing special equipment to aid in the rescue. Chips represent resources, such
as re-engines, ladders and personnel. Negotiation over these resources by the
dispatchers is needed to have an ecient deployment of resources. Players' scores in
this game may be set to depend solely on their individual performance as dispatchers
or may include, at some level, the score of their teammates.
5Note that the panel is displayed from the point of view of the \sun" player, and therefore a
\me" icon is displayed as the recipient of the oer.AGENT DECISION-MAKING IN OPEN MIXED NETWORKS 7
2.2. Related Work: Decision-Making Environments. A variety of simulation
systems have been developed to enable evaluation and comparison between com-
putational strategies for decision-making in particular domains. Prime examples
of such test-beds are (1) RoboCupRescue, which simulates rst-response strate-
gies that integrate disaster information, planning, and human interfaces [Kitano,
2000]; (2) the Trading Agent Competition (TAC), that facilitates the study of
bidding strategies for the procurement of resources as well as supply-chain manage-
ment [Arunachalam and Sadeh, 2005], (3) the Agent Reputation Test-bed (ART),
for studying reputation and trust in environments of varying agent-capabilities and
reliability [Fullam et al., 2004], and (4) the Electric Elves system for immersing
agent technology in scheduling tasks in organizations Pynadath et al. [2000].
CT is distinguished from these systems in several ways. First, these test-beds
require that signicant domain knowledge be represented in computer agents (e.g.,
modeling stock prices prior to bidding, estimating the number of people in danger in
a burning building). In contrast, CT allows agent designers to focus on such general
properties of interactions between humans and computers such as people's percep-
tion of the usefulness of an interruption request for information [Kamar et al., 2009a]
and the way people form teams to carry out tasks in strategic environments [van
Wissen, 2009]. This abstraction also has advantages for experiments that involve
people: First, human subjects need not be domain experts. Second, CT enables the
specication of dierent reward structures, allowing system-designers to vary the
importance of dierent decision-making factors such as the performance of others
or the group as a whole to the outcome of an individual. As a result, CT is novel in
addressing the need to have better ways of evaluating computer agent strategies in
contexts in which systems are participants in group activities that include people.
Although CT abstracts away from such domain specic details as re engines and
evacuation routes, it provides a task-like context in which decisions are made. This
task context means that decisions are presented less abstractly than payo matrices
or trees, the canonical forms used to present outcomes in behavioral economic
experiments. These canonical forms explicitly specify the payos to all players for
each potential strategy. Real-world decision-making seldom presents choices this
starkly. CT immerses people in an environment in which underlying relationships
among tasks, goals and resources matter. It thus places decision-making in a more
real context.
3. The Effects of Decision-Presentation on Human Negotiation
Behavior
This section provides empirical evidence that people's behavior is signicantly
more cooperative when they negotiate using CT than when they are presented with
payo-only representations of the sort common to studies in behavioral economics.
Recent work in the social sciences has demonstrated that people cooperate despite
the lack of direct short-term benets from cooperative behavior [Dreber et al., 2008,
Nowak, 2006]. This section shows the use of CT induces such cooperative behavior
and thus it provides support for CT as being the right kind of test-bed with which
investigate decision-making in open-mixed networks.
3.1. Empirical Design. We presented subjects with identical multi-agent decision-
making problems in two conditions and measured their behavior and outcomes. In
one condition, called the \task condition", people made decisions in the context of8 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
a CT game. In the other, the \table condition", they were given the decision in the
context of a payo-only table representation.
For the task condition, we used a 2-player CT setting that varied a conguration
of 4x4 boards, the chip allocations for each player, and the placement of the goal
square. The study comprised a one-shot negotiation setting for which one player
was designated the proposer and the other was designated the responder. Players
had full view of the board and each others' chips. The proposer player could make
of oer to exchange a particular subset of its chips for some subset of the responder's
chips. The responder player could accept or reject the proposer's oer. If no oer
was made (there was a 3-minute deadline for proposers to make oers), or if the
oer was declined, then both players were left with their initial allocation of chips.
If the oer was accepted, the chip exchanges were enforced by the game controller.
Following this interaction, both players' icons were automatically moved as close as
possible to the goal square given the chips in their possession and their computed
score.
The scoring function for players depended solely on their own performance: 100
points bonus for reaching the goal (otherwise, 50 points bonus); 5 points for each
chip left in a player's possession at the end of the game; 10 points deducted for
any square in the shortest path between a player's nal position in the game and
the goal-square. These parameters were chosen so that getting to the goal was by
far the most important component, but if a player could not get to the goal it was
preferable to get as close to the goal as possible, rather than hoard chips.
An example of one of the boards used in the study is given in Figure 1a. In this
example, neither player can get to the goal by using the original chip allocation. The
games used in the study all involved at least one of the players having insucient
chips to get to the goal, but not necessarily both.
The table condition consisted of a payo matrix representing potential oers that
could be selected by the proposer player in a CT game. Each oer was represented
as a pair of payos for the proposer and the responder players. Figure 2 shows
a snapshot of a game in this representation as seen from the point of view of a
proposer player. Each entry in the table represents an oer, and selecting one of
the entries corresponds to choosing the oer that was associated with the payos
inside the entry. One of the entries contained the no-negotiation alternative score
and was presented to players as the default outcome of the interaction.
The score that each player received if no oer was made was identical to the
score each player received if the oer was rejected by the responder. We refer to
this score as the \no-negotiation alternative" score and refer to the score that each
player received for an oer that was accepted by the responder as the \proposed
outcome" score.
A total of 32 subjects participated in the experiment. They were equally di-
vided between the two conditions. Participants in the task condition interacted
with each other using the CT environment, whereas those in the table condition
interacted with each other using the payo matrix representation. In both con-
ditions, participants were compensated in a manner that depended solely on their
individual scores, aggregated over all rounds of interaction. To prevent confounding
eects on their behavior, participants were randomly divided into the two condition
groups and seated in two rooms, such that no participant interacted with another
participant seated in the same room. Participants only interacted with others inAGENT DECISION-MAKING IN OPEN MIXED NETWORKS 9
Figure 2. Snapshot of an interaction in the table condition. Each
entry in the matrix lists a pair of payos representing the score to
the proposer player (left) and the responder player (right).
their condition group and were not provided any information about each other.
We trained each group of subjects and tested their prociency using a pre-study
questionnaire.
6
For each CT round that was played in the task condition, an equivalent round
was played in the table condition. Each entry in the table listed a payo pair rep-
resenting the payos to the proposer and responder player for a possible exchange.
For example, the payo matrix shown in Figure 2 is equivalent to the CT game
shown in Figure 1(a).
We use the term \table proposers" and \task proposers" to refer to the partici-
pants that were designated with the proposer role in the table and task condition
respectively (and similarly for responder players). We use the term \oer bene-
t" to refer to the dierence between the proposed outcome for an oer and the
no-negotiation alternative score for the game. We measured people's behavior in
the experiment using two features. The degree to which proposers were helpful to
responders was measured in terms of the average oer benet they proposed to
responders. Similarly, the degree to which proposers were selsh was measured in
terms of the average oer benet they proposed to themselves. These features are
not independent. For example, proposers can exhibit both a degree of selshness
and a degree of helpfulness based on the average benet of their oers.
3.2. Analysis of Proposer Behavior. Table 1 presents the average oer benet
to participants in the task and table conditions for proposers and responders. Table
6Subjects that did not score full points on the questionnaire were given a show-up fee and did
not participate in the experiment.10 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
Table 1. Average Benet of Exchange
Oer Benet to
Proposer Responder
Task 82.3 47.6
Table 98 36
proposers oered signicantly more benet to themselves than did task proposers
(t-test p < 0:05). Also, they oered signicantly less benet to table responders
than task proposers oered to task responders (t-test p < 0:01). Thus, proposers
were more likely to engage in helpful behavior, in the task setting, and less likely
to engage in selsh behavior.
Another result arising from the table is that proposers oered signicantly more
to themselves than they did to responders in both conditions (t-test p < 0:05).
However, the dierence between the benet for proposer and responders was sig-
nicantly larger in the table condition than in the task condition (t-test p < 0:05).
We can thus conclude that although proposers were competitive in both conditions,
they were signicantly more competitive in the table condition than in the table
condition.
Table 2. Average Benet for Accepted Exchanges
Proposer Responder Total
Task 79.5 56.4 135.9
Table 85.6 40.7 126.3
Table 2 shows the exchange benet to proposers and responders averaged over
all accepted proposals, as well as the total accumulated benet in each condition.
The benet to responders from accepted proposals was signicantly higher in the
task condition than in the table condition, and conversely for the proposers (t-test
p < 0:05). Thus, task responders outperformed table responders, whereas table
proposers outperformed task proposers.
Our results also found that the CT task setting had a positive eect on the
combined performance of participants. As the rightmost column shows, the total
performance (combined proposers and responders scores) was higher in the task
condition than in the table condition (t-test p < 0:1). The benet for accepted
exchanges is a measurement of performance, because the outcome of each round
of interaction was fully determined by the action of the responder. Although this
result was not signicant at the p < 0:05 condence level, it highlights that CT did
not only have an eect on people's helpful behavior tendencies, but also that this
helpful behavior was benecial overall for the participants.
3.3. Comparison with Nash-Equilibrium Strategies. This section compares
the oers that were made in the CT and table conditions with the oers dictated by
the exchange corresponding to the Nash equilibrium strategy. We use the term NE
exchange of a round to refer to the exchange prescribed by the Nash equilibrium
strategy prole for the round. This exchange oers the maximum benet for the
proposer, out of the set of all of the exchanges that oer non-negative benets to
the responder. For the CT scenario used in our experiments, the Nash equilibriumAGENT DECISION-MAKING IN OPEN MIXED NETWORKS 11
oer is the one that maximizes the proposer's benet out of the set of all possible
exchanges that oered any benet, however small, to the responder. Thus, the
NE exchange is a competitive oer, which is more benecial to proposers than to
responders.
Because proposers were more competitive in the table setting, we expected table
proposers to be more likely to oer NE exchanges than task proposers. We found
that the number of NE oers made in the table condition (57) was signicantly
greater than the number of NE oers made in the task condition (13), (chi-square
t < 0:01). To compare the extent to which the exchanges made by proposers in the
two conditions diered from the NE exchange, we plotted the average benet oered
by NE exchanges and by proposed exchanges for both task and table conditions,
as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Benet from Proposed Exchanges vs. NE Exchanges
The dierence between the average benet to responders from the NE oer and
the average proposed exchange was close to zero in the table condition, and large
and positive in the task condition (t-test p < 0:05). Similarly, the dierence between
the benet to proposers from the NE oer and the average proposed exchange was
close to zero in the table condition, and large and negative in the task condition
(t-test p < 0:05). The Euclidean distance between the points representing the NE
benet and the proposed exchange was signicantly larger in the task condition
than in the table condition. In fact, there was no statistically signicant dierence
between proposed exchanges in the table condition and NE oers; participants who
make decisions in the table condition were more likely to follow the equilibrium
choice.
These results align with recent work in the social sciences that has found dif-
ferences between people's behavior in eld studies and their behavior in controlled
laboratory experiments [Henrich et al., 2001]. However, they dier from classical
ndings which show that people do not adhere to traditional game theoretic equi-
libria in one-shot games such as prisoners' dilemma [Sally, 1995]. One possible
explanation for the adherence to game theoretic exchanges in the table condition
may be the fact that subjects were guaranteed the no-negotiation alternative score
in each game (unlike the canonical behavioral economics experiments, in which the
outcome for no negotiation was zero). The guarantee of a positive payo to pro-
posers could have made them less likely to fear rejection by the responders. Thus12 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
they oered exchanges that were more selsh (more game-theoretic) as compared
to prior studies.
3.4. The Context Hypothesis and Related Approaches. The results of the
experiment described above support the hypothesis that the way in which a decision
is represented inuences people's negotiation behavior. While considerable amount
of research in the social sciences has studied the eects of framing on behavior
this is the rst work that has explored the particular role played by task settings.
In particular, the result that people are more helpful and less competitive in the
task-like CT setting than when deciding in a payo-only context, suggests that
task settings have a positive eect on the way people (and in turn, the agents that
interact with people) behave. However, there are several alternative explanations
of this behavior. In this section, we rule out two obvious alternatives.
First, the competitive behavior exhibited by table proposers might be attribut-
able to the fact that the specic payos for each possible strategy was explicitly
presented to them, whereas proposers in the CT-task setting were not given the
payos explicitly. To rule out this hypothesis, we ran an additional experiment in
the CT game context. In this experiment, we used a CT setting like the one used
in the original task context, with one dierence: Subjects were able to access an
extended version of the path-nder panel that allowed them to view the payos for
potential paths to the goal. This setting preserved the task environment, but also
allowed for explicit display of the payos for both players associated with agree-
ments. We used the same set of games that were used in the original experiment.
The results showed that there was no signicant dierence in the average benet
allocated to proposers and responders in this intermediate representation than in
the CT-task condition (t-test t(29) = 2:34;p < 0:05). Thus, we can preclude the
lack of explicitly presented payo information in the CT context as an explanation
of the dierent proposers' behavior.
Second, the dierent proposer behaviors might be attributable to dierences in
the cognitive demand on subjects making decisions in two dierent settings. In both
of these settings, the number of possible oers for proposer players in each game
was large, and bounded by 28 = 256. Typically, there were between thirty and forty
oers in each game associated with a distinct benet to both proposer and responder
players. All of these strategies were explicitly presented to table proposers, while
the task proposers needed to infer the possible strategies (and payos) by reasoning
about the task setting. Both conditions potentially required large cognitive eort
that could confound players' reasoning about the degree of helpful behavior to
exhibit. For the original set of experiments, we provided decision support tools for
each decision representation setting, that were designed to mitigate these potential
cognitive load problems. In the CT game, subjects could use the Decision Aid
panel, shown in Figure 1c, to query the system for suggestions about the best
paths to take given any hypothetical chip distribution and the chips required for
these paths. In the table condition, subjects were able to sort the table by their
own benet or by benet to the other player. Thus, in both cases, we reduced the
eects of the decision-making complexity on the behavior exhibited by subjects.
Thus, the task context provided by CT remains the best explanation of the
more helpful, less competitive behavior exhibited by subjects in that condition. Al-
though we have not yet established how many of the elements essential for studying
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reected in the decision-making environment provided by CT, these results show
that the CT environment diers for non-trivial reasons from payo-only settings
and in ways that make decision-making in CT closer to the types of task settings
that occur in the real world.
Lastly, we note that this study is distinguished from work on collaborative user
interfaces and communication protocols for facilitating tasks such as preference
acquisition in e-commerce [Luo et al., 2006, Kamar et al., 2008], turn-taking [Chan
et al., 2008] and diagram generation [Bocionek, 1995]. Many aspects of interfaces
aect the way people interact; In designing both the task interface and the table
interface we attempted to create the most natural representations while restricting
the modalities to a graphic display. The fact that our results did not change even
when the payos were available to subjects using CT implies that the dierence in
behavior should not be attributed to the payos themselves, but to other aspects
relating to the context that CT provides, such as the explicit presentation of tasks,
goals and resources. We do not mean to imply that the dierence in behavior can be
attributed solely to one aspect or the other, such as the communication protocol.
4. Learning Social Preferences in Negotiation
This section describes an investigation of the hypothesis that computer agents
that model and learn the inuence of social factors on people's negotiation strate-
gies will outperform agents using traditional equilibrium strategies. It denes three
particular social factors|aggregate benet, advantage of outcome, advantage of
trade|which together with individual benet (the sole characteristic taken into
account by traditional equilibrium strategies) are used to characterize an oer. It
then describes an algorithm for learning these factors from data of people's perfor-
mance in a 2-player CT setting that highlights the task-resource relationship, and
presents the results of empirical studies comparing this learned model to equilib-
rium strategy approaches. The CT setting used in this study was identical to the
one described in Section 3.
4.1. A Model for Learning Social Preferences. This section describes a model
that can be used to enable a computer agent playing the role of the proposer to
make oers that take into account social factors that inuence people's decisions
when they are responders in this CT scenario. The model addresses three essential
challenges. First, people vary in the extent to which they are aected by social
factors when they negotiate. For example, an oer that is rejected by a competitive
responder might be accepted by a responder who is more altruistic. In addition,
people sometimes make mistakes, so they may not behave consistently and thus may
at times deviate from the model of their typical behavior. Third, people's behavior
has been shown to depend on their inter-dependence. For example, the extent of
generosity reected in a proposer's oer may depend on whether the proposer needs
chips from the responder to get to the goal.
The formal decision-making model used in this study is dened as follows: Let
k represent a CT game, associated with a set Ck of possible proposals. For each
proposal ck
j 2 Ck, let NNk
P and NNk
R denote the no-negotiation alternative scores
for the proposer and responder. These are the scores that the proposer and re-
sponder would receive if no agreement is reached in the game, and the players use14 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
the chips they were allocated at the onset of the game to move towards the goal-
square. Let PO
k;j
P and PO
k;j
R denote the proposed outcome scores for the proposer
and responder for proposal ck
j.
For each proposal ck
j of game k, we represent four social factors xk
j = fxk
j;1;:::;xk
j;4g
that aect the behavior of the responder agent.
 Individual benet xk
j;1 = PO
k;j
R   NNk
R
 Aggregate benet xk
j;2 = (PO
k;j
P + PO
k;j
R )   (NNk
P + NNk
R)
 Advantage of outcome xk
j;3 = PO
k;j
R   PO
k;j
P
 Advantage of trade xk
j;4 = (PO
k;j
R   NNk
P)   (PO
k;j
R   NNk
P)
The individual benet of an oer measures the extent to which the oer is benecial
to the responder. The aggregate benet of an oer measures the extent to which the
oer is benecial to both players. The other two social factors represent dierent
potential sources of inequality. The advantage of outcome for an oer measures
inequality in the proposed outcome scores for the oer, without reference to the
no-negotiation alternative scores. The advantage of trade for an oer measures
inequality in the benets to the agents of the oer. We illustrate these factors
using the oer in the game shown in Figure 1, in which the \me" player (the
proposer) oers one cyan chip to the \sun" player (the responder) in return for one
purple chip. This exchange provides both players with the chips they need to get
to the goal.7 It would allow the \sun" player to choose a shortest path of length
two to the goal. This player would have two chips left in its possession, and earn
a score of 120 points. Similarly, the oer would allow the \me" player to choose a
shortest path of length three to the goal (the path that is outlined in Figure 1a).
This player would have one chip left in its possession and earn a score of 110 points.
The no-negotiation alternative score for the \me" player in the game is 40 points,
while the no-negotiation alternative score for the \sun" player in the game is 50
points. Therefore the exchange above provides an individual benet to the \sun"
player of 70 points, an aggregate benet of (70+60)=130 points, and an advantage
of outcome and of trade of 10 points.
To enable learning of people's decision-making strategies in this CT game, we
introduce the notion of \responder types" and use them to represent ways that
responders may dier in the extent to which the various social factors aect their
decision-making. Each type represents a particular weighting of these factors, re-
ecting the dierent ways in which responders make decisions. There is a nite set
of responder types T, and a prior probability distribution over types, denoted by
P(T). The weight wi;l denotes the weighting of social preference xl for responder
type ti. These weights measure the relative importance for the responder of each
of the social preferences.
Let k denote a CT game instance. Given a proposal ck
j, possible social preferences
xk
j and responder type ti that is selected from P(T), we dene a social utility ui
7The exchange provides a higher individual benet to the \sun" player than to the \me" player,
according to the scoring function. This is because the \sun" player is initially located closer to
the goal square than the \me" player, and has the same number of four chips at the onset of the
game. Therefore it will be left with more chips than the \me" player if it accepts the exchange
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for the responder as a weighted sum
ui(xk
j) =
4 X
l=1
wi;l  xk
j;l
Let rk denote the response to exchange ck
j. A responder that always follows its
social utility function ui would agree to any exchange ck
j such that ui(xk
j) > 0. The
probability of acceptance of an exchange ck
j at game k by a responder of type ti is
dened by the following sigmoid function
(1) P(rk = accept j xk
j;ti) =
1
1 + e
 ui(xk
j )
There are two advantages to using this function to model the probability of
acceptance using this function. First, it captures the fact that people may make
mistakes with respect to their utility function. Accepting a proposal is more likely
when the utility ui is a large positive number than a small positive number. In
particular, the probability of acceptance converges to one as the utility becomes
large and positive, and to zero as the utility becomes large and negative. When
the utility is close to zero, the decision is less clear-cut, and the probability of
acceptance is close to 0.5, meaning that mistakes, or decisions that are inconsistent
with the utility function are more likely to be made by the responder. Second,
the mathematical properties of the sigmoid function facilitate the derivation of the
learning rules, as we will soon describe. The expected utility to the proposer for an
exchange ck
j of type ti can be written as
EUP(ck
j j ti) = P(rk = accept j xk
j;ti)  PO
k;j
P +
(1   P(rk = accept j xk
j;ti)  NNk
P)
(2)
The proposer does not get to observe the type of the responder it is interacting
with at each game. As a result, the best-response strategy for the proposer, as spec-
ied by Equation 3, will equal the unique proposal that maximizes the proposer's
expected score in the game for all the dierent types of possible responders.
ck
 = argmaxck
j 2C
X
ti2T
P(ti)  EUP(ck
j j ti) (3)
4.2. Learning a Mixture Model. To use Equation 3 in the model for a proposer
agent's oer strategy, it is necessary to learn the distributions over the type space
of responders and the likelihood that each type agrees to a particular oer. Let
D = fd(1);:::;d(N)g denote a set of instances, each instance representing a single
CT game. The proposal ck
j in CT game k comprises a (possibly empty) subset
of the chips of the proposer to be exchanged with some (possibly empty) subset
of the chips of the responder. We dene a data instance d(k) to consist of the
following features: a CT game k, a set Ck of possible oers in game k, the chosen
proposal ck
 2 Ck, the set of social preferences xk
 = fxk
;1;:::;xk
;4g associated with
the chosen proposal, and the response rk.
The goal of the learning task is to use the data set D to estimate the distri-
bution over the responder types and the strategy of the responder for each type.
As specied by Equation 1, the strategy for the responder depends on the social
preference weights w1;:::;w4. The likelihood of the response at game k is de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as P(rk j xk
;ti). Let errk
i denote an error term for predicting whether the proposal
ck
 at game k is accepted by responder type ti, dened as follows:
(4) errk
i = 1   P(rk j xk
;ti)
This term comes from assuming that if the model was a perfect predictor of the
responder, it would have predicted the true response rk with probability 1. The
dierence between 1 and the P(rk j xk
;ti) factor is the degree of error for the
model, given that the responder is using block ti.
We can minimize errk
i by taking the derivative of this function with respect
to each weight wj. Employing a gradient descent technique, we get the following
update rule for each weight wj, where  is the learning rate.
(5) wj = wj + 
X
k2D
xk
j
 
1   P(rk j xk
ti)

:
However, the responder type ti in a CT game is unknown. Therefore we dene
a mixture model that is comprised of a probability distribution P(T) over the type
space, and an associated set of weights wi;1;:::;wi;4 for each type ti. We sum over
the type space to compute errk, the expected error of the model at each instance
k for all types
(6) errk =
X
ti2T
P(ti j rk;xk
)  errk
i
where p(ti j rk;xk
) is the posterior probability of type ti given response rk and the
set of social preferences xk
i . This can be computed using Bayes rule. The degree
to which a training instance k can be used to learn the weights wi;1;:::;wi;4 is
proportional to the probability that each type ti generated instance k. We get the
following update rule for weight wi;j of type ti.
(7) wi;j = wi;j +   P(ti j rk;xk
)
X
k2D
xk
j
 
1   P(rk j xk
ti)

Computing the new values of the P(T) parameters is performed using an on-line
version of the EM algorithm [Neal and Hinton, 1998], a standard stochastic learn-
ing paradigm for estimating distributions in the presence of missing information.
We compute the expected sucient statistics for each type ti using the current
parameter settings and normalize to get a new distribution over the type space.
P(t) =
1
Z
X
k2D
P(ti j rk;xk
)
where Z is a normalizing factor.
4.3. Empirical Study. In this section we compare the performance of an agent
that used a social preference model to negotiate with people to agents using tradi-
tional equilibrium strategies. A total of 42 subjects participated in the experiment,
32 in the data collection phase and ten in the evaluation phase.
The CT games we used were randomly generated, but ltered to meet the fol-
lowing conditions: (1) at least one of the players could reach the goal after trading
with the other player; (2) it was not the case that both players could reach the goal
without trading. In this way, the games we trained and tested on characterized a
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used in the study, we recorded the board and chip settings, as well as the actions of
both agents. We ran two instances of the data collection phase, each with dierent
subjects, collecting 192 games in total. The data obtained in this phase was then
used to learn a model of human play.
We learned separate models for one, two and three possible types of responders,
referred to as M1, M2 and M3, respectively. The parameters in these models
represented dierent convergence points of the learning algorithm in the parameter
space of possible values for the social preferences. For all models, we used random
initial values for the distribution over responder types. For M1 we also set ran-
dom values for all of the social preference weights. For M2 and M3 we assigned
each responder type initial values that highlighted certain social preferences by
giving them signicantly higher initial value than others. Specically, in M2, one
of the responder types highlighted advantage-of-outcome and advantage-of-trade,
while the other highlighted aggregate benet. In M3, responder types highlighted
advantage-of-outcome, aggregate benet, and advantage-of-trade separately. We
ran each model on the data from the data collection phase.
To keep from over-tting the data, we stopped the learning process after no
improvement had been recorded on a held-out validation set. This occurred after
about 20 epochs. We obtained the following posterior parameter values for each
model. Model M1, which had a single responder type, learned social preference
weights (7:00;5:42;0:40;4:00) for individual benet, aggregate benet, advantage
of outcome and advantage of trade, respectively. This model thus describes a re-
sponder who cares about both players' outcome, but also likes to do better than
the proposer. In M2, the distribution over responder types was (0:36;0:63) and the
social preference weights were (3:00;5:13;4:61;0:46) and (3:13;4:95;0:47;3:30) for
each type respectively. This model thus describes two partially altruistic respon-
ders, both of whom have high weights for social welfare, while still caring about
their own benet. One of the types cares more about advantage of outcome, and
the other type cares more about advantage of trade. In M3, the distribution over
responder types assigned minuscule probability for the third type, and resembled
M2 in all other parameter values. We therefore decided to use M2 in the evaluation
phase.
Ten people participated as subjects in the evaluation study, which compared
the performance of three dierent computer agents. The computer agents were
always in the proposer role. Each of these agents was capable of mapping any CT
game position to some proposed exchange. The agent using the social preference
model, denoted SP, proposed the exchange matching the best-response strategy of
Equation 3. The second agent, denoted NE, proposed the exchange corresponding
to the Nash equilibrium strategy for the proposer role. A proposer that uses a Nash
equilibrium approach will make the oer that maximizes the proposer's benet out
of the set of all possible exchanges that oer non-negative benet to the responder.
ck
 = argmaxcjj(PO
k;j
R  NNk
R)>0(PO
k;j
P   NNk
P)
The third agent, denoted NB, proposed the exchange corresponding to the Nash
bargaining strategy [Nash, 1950] for the proposer.8
8The Nash Bargaining solution maximizes the product of the agents' utilities and is always
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Table 3. Total score achieved by agents
Model Total Reward Proposals Proposals No
Accepted Declined Oers
SP 2880 16 5 0
NE 2100 13 8 0
NB 2400 14 2 5
HU 2440 16 1 4
The subjects were divided into two groups with the members of each group play-
ing four rounds in a round-robin fashion. At each round, four concurrent games
were played by each group. One of the (human) subjects and the three computer
agents were designated as proposers; the other four (human) subjects were desig-
nated as responders. In each round, the game settings|including board layout,
start and goal positions and initial chip distributions|were the same for all of the
games played by members of the same group. Through the round-robin, each of
the (human) subjects played each of the computer agents at least once as well as
some other human player(s). No two people played each other more than once, but
people could play the same computer agent more than once.
Participants were given the same instructions and tutorial as in the data collec-
tion experiment. To make the conditions in both collection and evaluation phases
identical, we did not tell subjects they would be playing computer agents as well as
people.9 We recorded the settings of each game, as well as players' proposals and
responses. Altogether we collected 21 rounds, where each round consisted of four
games with dierent proposers, as explained above.
4.4. Results. The evaluation criterion for the SP agent was the total accumulated
reward received by the agent as compared to the agents that used other models to
guide their play. We also evaluated whether the oers that the SP agent made
were accepted more often by people than the oers made by other agents.
Table 3 presents the results of the evaluation phase for each of the agents used
in the experiment. It lists the total monetary reward, the number of proposals
accepted, the number of proposals rejected, and the number of times no oer was
proposed.
The computer proposer labeled NE always proposed the exchange that corre-
sponded to the proposer's strategy in the Nash equilibrium of each CT game. In
essence, this resulted in oering the best exchange for the proposer, out of the set
of all of the exchanges that are not worse o for the responder. Many of the ex-
changes proposed by this agent were declined. We hypothesize this is because they
were not judged as fair by the responder. This result closely follows the ndings of
behavioral game theory. The performance of NE was the worst of the four.
The computer proposer labeled NB always proposed the exchange that corre-
sponded to the proposer's strategy in the Nash Bargaining prole. In particular,
this always corresponded to an exchange that was Pareto optimal with respect to
the set of feasible allocations, that is, the proposed outcome was not worse o than
the no-negotiation alternative for both agents. This exchange consistently oered
more to the responder than the NE agent did for the same game, when the board
9Approval was obtained from the Harvard Human Subjects Committee for this procedure.AGENT DECISION-MAKING IN OPEN MIXED NETWORKS 19
Table 4. An example of a proposal made by the SP agent
Model Proposer Responder
Score Score
NNA 45 170
SP 70 150
and chip distribution enabled it to do so. Because NB tended to oer quite fa-
vorable deals to the responder, they were accepted more than the other computer
agents, provided that an oer was made. This player did not make any oer for
those games in which there was no Pareto optimal oer.
The results in the row labeled HU in the table combine the monetary rewards
for all of the human agents. The identity of the human proposer was dierent at
each round. With one exception, human oers were accepted whenever they were
made.
The computer proposer that followed our expected utility model, labeled SP,
achieved a signicantly higher reward than the NE, NB and HU (t-test comparison
for mean reward was p < :05;p < :05;p < :1, respectively). SP and HU had the
highest number of accepted proposals. Interestingly, the SP agent proposed the
same oer as the human proposer in 4 of the games, whereas the Nash equilibrium
agent did not match a human proposal in any game, and the Nash bargaining agent
matched human proposals in 2 games.
The distinguishing behavior of the SP agent is illuminated by the examples in
Tables 4 and 5 in which the NNA heading gives the no-negotiation alternative
scores. Table 4 presents a round in which SP proposed an exchange which was
accepted; the (human) responder was altruistic in this case. This example is an
interesting illustration of generalization in the learning systems. There was only
one observation in the learning phase in which a responder altruistically agreed to
such an exchange. In the evaluation, the SP agent proposed exchanges that were
asking such a favor from a respondent who was much better o four times, and
these oers were consistently accepted by the (human) subjects. The ability of the
SP agent to make the right kind of trade-os | when to ask for favors and when
not to ask for favors from the responder | was a contributing factor to its success.
Table 5 displays an example in which the proposed outcome of the exchange
proposed by NE, while benecial for the responder, was lower than the exchange
proposed by SP. The NE exchange was rejected, while the SP exchange was
accepted. This dierence seems to indicate that the responders in this game cared
about the equality of outcomes. Note that in this exchange, the SP exchange and
the exchange proposed by the human were equal.
4.5. Related Work: Learning from People. The results reported in this sec-
tion relate to several dierent strands of prior research that address, in a vari-
ety of contexts, the importance of learning for agents working with people. Past
works in AI have used heuristics, equilibrium strategies, and opponent modeling
approaches toward building computer agents that negotiate with people. For a re-
cent comprehensive review, see Lin and Kraus [2010]. Within repeated negotiation
scenarios, Kraus et al. [2008] modeled human bilateral negotiations in a simulated20 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
Table 5. An example of the oers made by all agents in a single game
Model Proposer Responder Accepted
Score Score
NNA 75 150
SP 170 170 Yes
NE 180 160 No
NB 150 190 Yes
HU 170 170 Yes
diplomatic crisis characterized by time constraints and deadlines in settings of com-
plete information. They adapted equilibrium strategies to people's behavior using
simple heuristics, such as considering certain non-optimal actions. Jonker et al.
[2007] designed computer strategies that involve the use of concession strategies to
avoid impasses in the negotiation. Byde et al. [2003] constructed agents that bar-
gain with people in a market setting by modeling the likelihood of acceptance of a
deal and allowing agents to renege on their oers. Traum et al. [2003] constructed
agents for the training of individuals to develop leadership qualities and interview-
ing capabilities. Recent approaches have used learning techniques to model the
extent to which people exhibit dierent social preferences when they accept oers
in multiple interaction scenarios [Oshrat et al., 2009, Lin et al., 2008].
Our work is also related to approaches for elicitation of users' preferences for
automated negotiation [Luo et al., 2006, Castro-Schez et al., 2004]. In these works,
people were asked to disclose information about their preferences over various nego-
tiation deals, and evaluate various acquisition models that trade-o the importance
of dierent features of an agreement to learn a parsimonious representation of users'
preferences. However, the participants of open, mixed networks directly negotiate
in task settings and it is not possible to ask people about their preferences directly.
Indeed, people are generally reluctant to reveal their goals and preferences when
they negotiate in task settings [Gal et al., 2009]. Thus we took a dierent approach,
namely to infer people's utility functions from their negotiation behavior.
Lastly, this work is also related prior work include adaptation to user preferences
for improved human-computer interface design or computer-supported collaborative
agents that infer users' goals and intentions [Horvitz, 1999]. These user models
inform agent-design for applications such as oce assistants [Bocionek, 1995], and
scheduling and meeting management [Pynadath et al., 2000]. Our work diers
from these in its focus on learning people's decision-making in strategic|rather
than collaborative|settings, and adapting to the social factors that guide their
play.
5. Repeated Negotiation in Settings of Full Information
This section describes a novel agent design for a mixed-network setting that
extends the one described in the previous section to include multiple negotiation
rounds and non-binding agreements. Such settings characterize many types of
real-world scenarios, including diplomatic relations, trade agreements and contract
negotiations, but have not been considered before in the design of agents that
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eective computer negotiation strategies. In particular, when agreements are not
enforceable, negotiators may initially behave reliably, but eventually take advantage
of others that trust them.
The study described in this section focuses on negotiation between computer
agents and humans under conditions of full information, while Section 6 focuses on
negotiation solely between computer agents under conditions of incomplete infor-
mation. Together, they demonstrate CT's exibility in allowing to congure more
complex negotiation protocols that support repeated negotiation and allow to con-
trol the extent to which participants abide to agreements. To date, all work on
human-computer negotiation assumes that agreements are binding, and uses con-
strained negotiation protocols that do not allow people to reveal information or
to argue their positions when they negotiate. An exception is an agent proposed
by Kraus and Lehmann [1995] that was developed for a specic domain, that of
diplomacy, and which did not reason about behavioral traits of participants.
We hypothesized that to be successful in settings where agreements are non-
binding, agents need to (1) model behavioral traits that aect the negotiation
behavior of other participants; and (2) adapt its negotiation strategy to the way
these traits change over time. To this end, we designed an agent that explicitly
modeled the extent to which its negotiation partners were reliable and helpful. We
begin the section by describing the CT setting, then outline the strategy used by
the agent and provide an empirical evaluation of this strategy when negotiating
with other people.
5.1. The CT Setting. The CT setting described in Section 3.1 was extended as
follows: First, players were allowed to renege on their agreements in part or in
full. This was done by introducing a transfer phase which immediately followed the
negotiation phase, and required chips to be transferred manually. In contrast, in
the CT setting described in Section 3.1 the chip transfer was automatic. Second,
the negotiation protocol included a recurring sequence of negotiation interactions
that allowed players to make and agree to oers, transfer chips and move about the
board.
This study used two dierent board congurations. In all of these boards there
was a single distinct path from each player's initial location to its goal square.
One of the board congurations exhibited a symmetric dependency relationship
between players: Neither player could reach the goal given its initial chip allocation,
and there existed at least one exchange such that both players could reach the
goal. We referred to players in this game as task co-dependent. The other board
type exhibited an asymmetric dependency relationship between players: One of the
players, referred to as task independent, possessed the chips it needed to reach the
goal, while the other player, referred to as task dependent, required chips from the
task independent player to get to the goal. An example of the task co-dependent
board is shown in Figure 4. In this game both \me" and \O" players are missing
three chips to get to the goal. The relevant path from the point of view of the \me"
player is outlined.
At the onset of the game, one of the players was randomly allocated the role of
proposer, while the other was given the role of responder. The interaction proceeded
in a recurring sequence of communication, transfer and movement phases. In the
communication phase the proposer could make an oer to the responder, who could
accept or reject the oer. In the transfer phase, both players could choose chips22 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
(a) Board Panel (b) Chip Display Panel
(showing the chips in the
possession of both par-
ticipants)
Figure 4. Snapshots of CT GUI
to transfer to the other player. The transfer action was done simultaneously, such
that neither player could see what the other player transferred until the end of the
phase. In particular, players were not required to full agreements: A player could
choose to transfer more chips than were agreed, or any subset of the chips that were
agreed, including transferring no chips at all. In the movement phase, players could
manually move their icons on the board across one square by surrendering a chip in
the color of that square. At the end of the movement phase, a new communication
phase began. The players alternated roles, such that the previous proposer was
designated as a responder, and vice versa.
These phases repeated until the game ended, which occurred when one of the
following conditions held: (1) at least one of the participants reached the goal
square; or, (2) at least one of the participants did not move for three consecutive
movement phases. At this point, both participants were automatically moved as
close as possible to the goal square using the chips in their possession and their
score was computed as follows: 100 points bonus for getting to the goal square, 5
points bonus for any chip left in a player's possession; 10 points penalty for each
square left in the path from a player's nal possession and the goal square.
5.2. The Personality-Based Agent. The agent that we constructed for this
setting, called the Personality Based (PURB) agent, modeled other participants
in terms of two behavioral traits: helpfulness, and reliability.10 The helpfulness
measure of participants, denoted h, represented the extent to which they shared
resources with their negotiation partners through initiating and agreeing to pro-
posals. This was computed as the percentage of proposals in the game in which
participants oered more chips to their negotiation partners than they requested
for themselves. The reliability measure of participants, denoted r, represented the
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extent to which they kept commitments with their negotiation partners. This was
computed as the ratio between the number of chips transferred by participants and
the number of chips they actually oered, averaged over all proposals in the game.
Together, we refer to the pair (h;r) as the cooperativeness measure of a participant.
5.3. Social Utility Function. The PURB agent used a social utility function to
negotiate with people which was a weighted combination of the several features. For
the remainder of this section we will use the term \agent" to refer to the PURB
agent, and \person" to refer to its negotiation partner.
(1) The expected future score for the PURB agent. This score was estimated
using a heuristic function that estimated the benet to i agent from a
potential exchange. It depended on the probability that PURB will get to
the goal given that proposal O is fullled at a state s which comprises a
board game, the positions of both participants on the board, and the chips
in their possession. We denote this probability as P(G j s;O), and dene
the expected future score to i as
(P(G j s;O)  100) + (1   P(G j s;O)  10  d) + c  5
where 100 is the number of bonus points to get to the goal according to
the CT scoring function; d is the Manhattan distance of the agent from its
nal position on the board and the goal square, given that the agreement
was fullled the p; 10 is the number of penalty points for each square in
the distance from the nal position of PURB and the goal square; c is the
number of chips left in the player's possession after it advances to the goal
using the shortest possible path, and 5 is the number of points awarded
to the player for each chips left in its possession at the end of the game.
The probability P(G j s;O) to get to the goal at state s given proposal
O was estimated as the ratio between the number of chips that the other
participant delivered to the PURB agent, and the number of chips that the
PURB agent was missing to get to the goal at state s given that O was
fullled.
(2) The expected future score for the other participant (computed in the same
way as for the PURB agent).
(3) The cooperativeness of the other participant (in terms of helpfulness and
reliability).
(4) The perceived cooperativeness of the other participant. This feature repre-
sented the PURB agent's model of the other participant's beliefs about its
own reliability and helpfulness.
The weights for the features of the social utility function were set by hand, and
depended on the dependency relationships between participants as well as their
cooperative measures. Generally, as the other participant increased its coopera-
tiveness measures, the weighting in the social utility function for PURB that was
associated with the score of the other participant were increased. This was to pro-
vide an incentive to the PURB agent to be more generous when its negotiation
partner was cooperative. Each time an agreement was reached and transfers were
made in the game, the PURB agent updated the helpfulness and reliability mea-
sures of both agents. Using this social utility allows the PURB agent to vary its
strategy based on its estimate of the other participant's cooperativeness measure.24 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
For example, if the reliability of the other participant was high, this would increase
the social utility of actions that favour the other participant.11
5.4. Rules of Behavior. The second component of PURB's decision-making par-
adigm was a set of rules that narrowed the search space of possible actions to be
considered by the agent when using its social utility. These rules depended on as-
pects relating to the state of the game (e.g., the number of chips each agent had,
whether a participant can independently reach the goal). At each step of the game,
the PURB agent used its social utility function to choose the best action out of the
set of possible actions that were constrained by the rules. The rules were designed
such that the PURB agent begins by acting reliably, and adapts over time to the
individual measure of cooperativeness that is exhibited by its negotiation partner.
These rules are based in part on a decision-making model designed to adapt to
people's negotiation behavior in dierent cultures [Gal et al., 2010, to appear].
To enable to specify a nite set of rules for dierent measures of reliability and
helpfulness, the possible values that these traits can take were divided into three
equal intervals representing low, medium or high measures. For example, low re-
liability measures ranged from 0 to 1
3. We then dened the cooperativeness of an
agent to depend on the extent to which it was reliable and helpful. Specically, we
dened the cooperativeness of a participant to be high when it exhibited high help-
fulness and high reliability measures, or high helpfulness and medium helpfulness
measures; the cooperativeness measure of a participant was medium when it ex-
hibited medium reliability and medium helpfulness measures, or medium reliability
and high helpfulness measures; the cooperativeness measure of a participant was
low when it exhibited low reliability measures (regardless of its helpfulness mea-
sure) or medium reliability measures and low helpfulness measure. These values
were tuned by hand on games that were not considered in the evaluation.
We now list the set of rules used by the PURB agent in combination with its
social utility function:
a) Making Proposals The PURB agent generated a subset of possible oers and
non-deterministically chose any proposal out of the subset that provided a max-
imal benet (within an epsilon interval) according to its social utility function.
Before outlining the rules by which the set of possible proposals were gener-
ated, we will introduce the following notation: We say an agent i is \stronger"
than agent j if i is able to reach the goal independently of j, or if it requires
less chips to reach the goal than j. Let Oi=j represent the number of proposals
in which agent i asks for as many chips as it receives; Oi>j represents the set
of proposals in which i asks for more chips than it receives; Oj>i represents the
set of proposals in which i asks for less chips than it receives.
Oers were generated by PURB in a way that considered which participant
was stronger than the other. Let i denote the PURB agent and j denote the
other participant. When participants were co-dependent, the set of possible
oers i considered included those oers that favoured the stronger agent. If i
was stronger than j, then the set Oi>j was considered (i.e., i requested from j
more chips than i proposed to j) And conversely for the case in which j was
11Although this strategy may resemble the principle behind the Tit-for-Tat paradigm, de-
pending on PURB's model, its strategies can be more nuanced. For example, depending on the
dependency relationships that hold in the game, the PURB agent may oer a generous exchange
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stronger than i. In both cases, the set Oi=j was also generated and considered
(i asks for as many chips as it sends).
In the other dependency roles, the oers that were generated depended on
the cooperativeness measure of j:
1) When the cooperativeness of j was high or medium, then if i was stronger
than j, then the set of possible oers that i considered included Oi>j. This is
because that when the reliability of j was high, there was a higher likelihood
that j would keep its commitments, and thus the set of possible exchanges
for i included exchanges that were highly favorable to i. However, if j was
stronger than i, then oers were chosen from the set Oj>i. This was because
that i wished to minimize the chances that j would reject its oers given that
j did not need i to get to the goal.
2) When the cooperativeness of j was low, then oers were chosen from the set
Oi>j, regardless of which agent was stronger. This was because i did not
expect j to full its agreements, and thus it proposed oers that were less
benecial to j.
b) Accepting Proposals As a responder, the PURB agent accepted an oer if it
was more advantageous to it than the oer it would make as a proposer in the
same game state, or if accepting the oer was necessary to prevent the game
from terminating. To state this formally, let ui(O;accept j s) denote the social
utility for i from an oer O made by j at state s. Let O0 denote the oer that
agent i would make at state s according to the rules in (a). Agent i accepted an
oer O if ui(O;accept j s)  ui(O0;accept j s). In addition, i would accept any
proposal that prevented the game from ending, which occurs when the following
conditions hold: (1) the chips in the possession of agent i do not allow it to
move on the board at state s; (2) the oer Oj allows agent i to move; and (3)
if i rejects the oer, the limit for dormant turns will be reached and the game
would end.
c) Transferring Chips These rules specify the extent to which the PURB agent
fullled its agreements in the game. This behavior directly depended on its
model of the other's reliability:
If the reliability of j was low, it was likely that the other participants would
not full its agreement. Therefore i did not send any of its promised chips.
However, if both agents were task dependent, and the agreement resulted in both
agents becoming task independent then i sent half of the promised chips with a
given probability, because it was not certain that j would full the agreement.
If the reliability of j was high, then i sent all of the promised chips.
If the reliability of j was medium, then the extent to to which i was reliable
depended on the dependency relationships in the game:
1) If j was task dependent, and the agreement resulted in j becoming task
independent, then i sent the largest set of chips such that j remained task
dependent.
2) If the exchange resulted in the PURB agent becoming task independent, and
j remaining task dependent, then the PURB agent sent all of the promised
chips, or two thirds of its promised chips, depending on its condence level of
j's reliability measure being medium. This condence level depended on the
number of times in which the PURB agent interacted with j and j exhibited
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Co-Dep. Task Ind. Task Dep. Total
PURB agent vs. People (n = 28) 163 (n = 12) 187 (n = 18) 82 (n = 58) 143
People vs. People (n = 50) 131 (n = 30) 181 (n = 30) 102 (n = 110) 136
Table 6. Performance for dierent Dependency Conditions
3) If both agents were task dependent, and the agreement resulted in both agents
becoming task independent, then i sent all of the promised chips.
Combining the PURB agent's social utility function with these rules allows it to
adapt its negotiation behavior to that of the other participant.
5.5. Empirical Methodology and Results. Fifty-four human subjects partici-
pated in the study drawn from a pool of undergraduate computer science students
at Bar Ilan University. Each participant was given an identical 30 minute tutorial
on Colored Trails that did not disclose the actual boards used in the study. Each
participant was seated in front of a terminal for the duration of the study, and
could not speak to any of the other participants.
There were two conditions in the study. In the rst condition, people played
other people while in the second condition, people played the PURB agent. In all,
there were 110 games that were played by people, and 58 games that were played
by the PURB agent and people. Subjects were not told whether they would be
playing a person or a computer agent.12
Unless otherwise stated, the following results compare the behavior of the PURB
agent playing people with that of people playing people. We list the number of
observations and means for each result. Signicance of results were conrmed for
p < 0:05 using parametric statistical tests. Table 6 shows the average performance
for the PURB agent and people, measured as the average score obtained in all
games played.
5.5.1. Analysis of Performance. As shown by the \total" column in the table, the
PURB agent was able to negotiate as well as people: There was no statistically sig-
nicant dierence between its total average performance (143 points) and people's
performance (136 points). However, there were distinct dierence in performance
for dierent dependency relationships between players. When players were co-
dependent, the PURB agent signicantly outperformed people (163 points versus
131 points). People outperformed the PURB agent in the task dependent condition
(102 versus 82 points), but the dierence was not statistically signicant. There was
also no signicant dierence in performance between the PURB agent and people
in the task independent condition. In addition (and not shown in the table), in the
co-dependent setting, the PURB agent was able to reach the goal 90% of the time,
signicantly more often than people, who reached the goal 67% of the time. There
was no signicant dierence between people and the PURB agent in the extent to
which the goal was reached when one of the players was task independent and the
other player was task dependent.
12The exact wording given to subjects were \you may be interacting with a computer agent
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Co-Dep. Task Ind. Task Dep. Total
PURB agent vs. People (0.79, 0.27) (0.92, 0.62) (0.74, 0.62) (0.81, 0.38)
People vs. People (0.53, 0.56) (0.63, 0.58) (0.41, 0.58) (0.49, 0.53)
Table 7. Actual Reliability (left) and probability of acceptance
(right) Measures
Co-Dep. Task Ind. Task Dep. Total
PURB agent vs. People (74, 86) (79, 23) (10, 81) (54.33, 63.33)
People vs. People (40, 52)) (66, 15) (14, 89) (40, 52)
Table 8. other-benet (left) and self-benet (right) Measures
5.5.2. Analysis of Behavior. The purpose of this section is to analyze the extent to
which both people and the PURB agent fullled their commitments in negotiation.
For any two participants i and j, let Ci denote the set of chips in possession of i
at round n in the game. Let O = (Oi;Oj) denote a proposal at round n, where
Oi  Ci was the set of chips that i agreed to send to j. Let O
i  Ci be the set
of chips actually sent by i following the agreement. (And similarly dene Cj;Oj,
and O
j.) Let ri(fCi [ Ojg) denote the score to player i in the case that j sent all
of its promised chips Oj, and i did not send any of its chips. We assume that the
score is computed using the scoring function for the CT game that is described in
Section 5.1. We refer to this value as the score that was promised by j in proposal
O. The factor ri(fCi [ O
jg) denotes the score to player i given the chips O
j that
j actually delivered to i. We refer to this as the actual score to i given the chips
that j transferred. The actual reliability of j given proposal O at round n is the
ratio between the promised score to i from the chips Oj in proposal O and the
actual score to i given the chips that O
j chose to transfer. This is computed as
ri(fOi[O

j g)
rifCi[Ojg . Note that this score-based measure of reliability is dierent than the
chip-based measure of reliability that was used by the PURB agent (Section 5).
Table 7 compares the actual reliability and probability of acceptance for the
PURB agent playing other people, and people playing other people. As shown in
the Table, for all dependency relationships the PURB agent was consistently more
reliable than people. Also shown by the table is that the PURB agent accepted
oers signicantly less often than did people (38% vs. 53%). In addition there was
a signicant correlation of 0:42 between the PURB agent's reliability and perfor-
mance, while there was no such eect for people. (This result is not shown in the
table). Thus, although the performance of the PURB agent was similar to people in
score, the negotiation strategy used by the PURB agent was dierent from that of
people in several ways. First, the PURB agent was signicantly more reliable than
people; and second, the PURB agent was less likely to accept oers than people.
We also compared the types of oers made by people and those made by the
PURB agent, as well as how often these oers were accepted. Table 8 shows the
average benet from all proposals in a game that are associated with the proposing
player (self-benet), and the responding player (other-benet). These results show
that when both players were co-dependent, the PURB agent made o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dominated (these oers were signicantly more benecial to both participants) the
oers made by people.
Although the PURB agent we designed was able to negotiate as well as people,
our analysis showed that its negotiation strategy diered from people: When it was
task co-dependent its oers Pareto dominated those of people. In this condition,
people exhibited medium reliability, and the PURB agent responded to this by
generating oers that beneted itself more than people, as described in its strat-
egy. Interestingly, the proposals made by the PURB agent also oered more to
people than did proposals made by people (74 versus 52 points). On average, the
PURB agent was less likely to accept oers than people; also, it was more reliable
than people in all conditions, and there was a signicant correlation between the
reliability of the PURB agent and its performance.
We conclude this section by describing an example that highlights the way the
PURB agent was able to adapt to the dierent behavioral traits. The example is
taken from two games in which the PURB agent was task independent, and its
negotiation partner was task dependent. In both of these games, there was an
identical oer made by the human participant that would allow both players to
reach the goal. This example consisted of the person asking 1 chip from the PURB
agent and oering 3 chips in return. The proposal was accepted by the PURB agent
in both games. In the rst game, the PURB agent chose to full the agreement and
sent the promised chip. However, in the second game, the PURB agent chose not
to full the agreement and did not send the promised chip. This was because the
reliability of the person in the rst game was considerably lower than the reliability
of the person in the second game.
6. Repeated Negotiation in Settings of Incomplete Information
In this section, we describe a variant of the PURB agent that was designed to
negotiate in a setting that modied the one in Section 5 as follows: (1) the par-
ticipants were agent-based, some of which were designed by human subjects; (2)
the participants in the negotiation lack pertinent information about each other's
resources when they make decisions; and (3) the negotiation included multi-party
interactions of four participants. The relevance of this mixed-network setting to ne-
gotiations of the type that may occur in the real world is in its inclusion of agents
playing unknown negotiation strategies. Such negotiations are already common-
place in electronic commerce applications such as ebay, where people can construct
automatic bidders to serve as proxies and represent themselves in the bidding pro-
cess. The object of the study was to build an agent that is able to negotiate
prociently in this setting, despite its uncertainty about others' resources as well
as their negotiation strategy.
Because our setting included numerous negotiation partners and limited infor-
mation, the agent-design we describe in this section modied the PURB design in
two ways: First, it was endowed with a separate adaptation mechanism for each
negotiation partner, and second, it estimated the cooperativeness of the negotia-
tion partners without knowing the actual benet associated with potential actions
in the game.
6.1. Experimental Design. We modied the CT repeated interaction setting de-
scribed in Section 5 so that each participant could observe its own chips, but not
the chips of the other participants. Three types of agents were used in the study.AGENT DECISION-MAKING IN OPEN MIXED NETWORKS 29
Perceived Matched
Cooperativeness Cooperativeness
LL LL
LM LM
LH LM
MM LM
MH MM
HM HM
HH MM
Table 9. Matching scheme used by VP agent to adapt its coop-
erativeness to the cooperativeness of its negotiation partners
The rst type of agents were Peer-Designed (PD) agents, created by graduate-level
computer science students at Bar Ilan University who were not given any explicit
instructions beyond designing an agent that will represent themselves in a negoti-
ation.
The second type of agent was a Constant Personality (CP) agent. This agent
used a technique to estimate the cooperativeness of the other participants that was
similar to the PURB agent described in Section 5.
The third type of agent was a Varying Personality (VP) agent. This agent was a
variant of PURB that extended its utility function described in Section 5 to adopt a
separate measure of cooperativeness for dierent levels of cooperativeness exhibited
by the other participants. Table 9 species a match between cooperativeness mea-
sures exhibited by the VP agent given the cooperativeness measures exhibited by its
negotiation partners. The matching process was done empirically, using a held-out
test-set of PD agents that were not used again in the evaluation process. Both VP
and CP agents were adaptive: they changed their behavior as a function of their
estimate of others' cooperativeness, given the history of their observations. How-
ever, the VP agent adopted a unique measure of cooperativeness for each player,
whereas the measure of cooperativeness for the CP agent was constant.
A series of repeated games were played between the VP agent and with the other
agents in the systems. Each agent's nal outcome was the aggregate of its scores in
all of the games it participated in. For purpose of analysis, we classied PD and CP
agents as either \cooperative" or \non-cooperative" according to the following: Co-
operative CP agents were those that engaged in helpful exchanges more than 50% of
the time and reneged on their commitments less than 20% of the time. We expected
cooperative agents to realize opportunities for exchange with each other more often
than non-cooperative agents and to exceed them in performance, as measured by
the score in the game. We also expected that in some cases, non-cooperative agents
would be able to take advantage of the vulnerability of those cooperative agents
that allow themselves to be exploited. Additionally, we hypothesized that the VP
agent would be able to identify and reciprocate cooperative agents more quickly
than CP or PD agents, while staying clear of agents that are non-cooperative. As
a result, the VP agent would perform better than all other agents in the game.
We ran 5,040 games in our experiment, played in 1,080 rounds of three consec-
utive games each. The board games we used in each round varied the task depen-
dency relationships between players. There were 4 players in each game, consisting30 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
VP agent PD and CP agents
Cooperative 170.6 114.8
Non-Cooperative 142.5 98.2
Table 10. Average performance of VP agent against
cooperative/non-cooperative agents (3 repeated games)
Exchange Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Type agents agents
Reciprocal 60% 25%
Idle 20% 39%
Table 11. Percentage of exchange types proposed by VP agent
of a VP agent, two CP agents, and one of the PD agents. The boards used were
generated to span all possible task dependency role (dependent, co-dependent). Ta-
ble 10 presents the average score for the VP agent when playing against cooperative
and non-cooperative agents across all games. The scores reported in the table sum
over the other players in the game.
As shown by the table, the average score achieved by the VP agent was sig-
nicantly higher than all other agents, regardless of their level of cooperativeness.
Also, the VP agent's score when playing against cooperative agents (170.6) was
higher than its score when playing against non-cooperative agents (142.5). Cooper-
ative agents also beneted from cooperating with the VP agent: their performance
was signicantly higher than their non-cooperative counterparts (114.8 vs. 98.2).
In addition, the VP agent engaged in cooperative exchanges with cooperative
agents signicantly more often than the other agents, while the amount of time the
VP agent remained idle when dealing with non-cooperative agents was longer than
the amount of time other agents remained idle (Table 11).
To conclude, in repeated game settings, the VP agent, which conditioned its own
personality based on its estimate of others, outperformed all of the other agents
in the system. Some types of agents escaped identication in intermediate rounds,
resulting in an increase in their scores. However, the general performance of the
VP agent was not aected. It performed better than all of the other agents in
all of the games we played, and increased its score from game to game during
the nal rounds of the experiment. This shows that adopting a separate measure
of cooperativeness for dierent agents is key to agents' success in task settings of
incomplete information.
6.2. Related Work: Adapting to Agents' Behavioral Traits. The results
reported in this section relate to recent approaches for learning to adapt to others'
negotiation behavior in repeated interactions under uncertainty13. One strand of
research involves learning and adapting to agents' behavioral traits. Zhang et al.
[2002] explored the trade-o between selshness and helpfulness in environments in
which agents were uncertain about the helpful nature of others in the system. They
showed that although realizing every opportunity for cooperation was impossible,
13Other works have considered negotiation settings that allow reputation and revelation mech-
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selsh agents do better than helpful agents as the rate of uncertainty in the system
grows. Hogg and Jennings [2001] proposed a model in which agents' utilities were a
weighted summation of each others' expected outcomes. By learning these weights
from observations, agents changed their measure of helpfulness over time. When
all agents in the system were adaptive, high exploration rates led agents to seek out
new negotiation opportunities and increased the overall social welfare of the group.
All these models allowed agents to change their measure of helpfulness over time
as a function of their model of others, and investigated the eects of this behavior
on agents' cooperation and system performance. However, these works assumed
that players full their commitments following agreements, and did not model the
behavioral types of others.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper has presented studies which demonstrate the importance of learning
and of incorporating social factors into agents' decision-making models when they
operate in open, mixed networks. The studies focused on the design of computer
agents for negotiation with each other, or with people, in settings that varied the
availability of information, the negotiation protocol and the interdependence's that
held between agents. For settings of complete information, our ndings showed
that
 Computer agents can successfully learn the extent to which dierent people
are aected by social factors, and that this improves their decision-making.
 Agents that learn can outperform computational agents using traditional
game- and decision-theoretic strategies.
For settings in which complete information about agents' resources is not available,
or in which agents can renege on agreements, we have shown that
 Computer agents that adapt their level of cooperation to the varying degree
of helpful behavior exhibited by others outperform computer agents that
do not adapt.
 This adaptation process also facilities successful interaction among com-
puter agents and people.
These studies used dierent congurations of the CT test-bed, a framework
designed to investigate decision-making in such networks. The advantage of using
CT is that it presents decisions to people in a context that mirrors task settings
in the real world. People are more likely to engage in cooperative behavior in CT
environments than when in the context of traditional representations such as payo
matrices.
Additional work by the co-authors and others further demonstrate the usefulness
of the CT framework in investigating a variety of questions about decision-making
in group settings. In particular, the Colored Trails system has been used to con-
struct and evaluate computational models of human reciprocity [Gal and Pfeer,
2007], to investigate the role of gender and social relationships in people's negotia-
tion behavior [Katz et al., 2008], the way people reason about belief hierarchies in
negotiation [Ficici and Pfeer, 2008] and the way people respond to interruptions
from computers [Kamar et al., 2009b]. CT has proved to support the rapid pro-
totyping and ease of analysis of dierent kinds of decision-making models that is
made possible when using CT. It has also been used as a pedagogical tool in for32 GAL, GROSZ, KRAUS, PFEFFER, AND SHIEBER
teaching agent design to students in courses at Harvard, Ben-Gurion and Bar-Ilan
Universities.
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